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In Ukraine, 13 years after independence
from totalitarian pressure, the
unreformed government machine is still
not capable of dealing with the
challenges of a new political reality.
Declarations of democratic ideological
principles continue to substitute for the
real development of institutional
capacity for a democratic political
system, as officials are exhorted to be
honest and the government—to be
transparent. No advisory or executive
body has yet been set the task of
actually carrying out the basic changes
that might empower a new democratic
system of governance such as:
• transforming the government apparatus
so that it can carry out the new role of
providing services to its citizens and
managing limited public resources
under pressure from now$legitimate but
divergent and even conflicting interest
groups, while bearing the consequences
of its decisions in a transparent
manner;
• establishing a pattern of co$existence
between elected local governments and
the central government unimaginable
in soviet times;
• setting up an independent judiciary.
What is effective democratic
government? 
To be effective, a democratic
government faces challenges of a
radically different nature than those
faced by a totalitarian government with
all powers in one hand:
• It has to solve an unsolvable dilemma:
to concentrate more power in order to
push through strategic decisions and at
the same time to give away power, to
decentralize and hear every voice. 
• Any democratic government works
under constant pressure from
legitimate interest groups that
sometimes compete fairly ruthlessly
and are constantly pulling elected
officials in opposite directions during
the decision$making process.
• It has to be capable of stepping on the
toes of powerful groups.
• It has to transform itself from currying
favor to providing services to its
citizenry.
• It has to take strategic decisions
concerning ever$limited public
resources under the vigorous pressure
of legitimate public competition for
these resources.
• It needs to concentrate enough power
to sustain a stable policy long enough
for it to bear results. 
What hasn’t been done: 
Strategic mistakes
The attempt to create structures based on
the professionalization of the civil service
and establishing formal and transparent
relations with politicians failed. Nor did
the Government succeed in establishing a
division between political and
administrative functions in terms of
philosophy, organization, personnel or
document circulation.
Evidence of that is the failure of an
experiment that introduced State
Secretaries, who were meant to embody
the ultimate separation between the
political and administrative functions in
the Government. Introduced in May 2001,
the new system was not provided with any
institutional capacity: clear functions,
procedures, standards and skills were not
developed. No training was ever held for
those in top posts to instill qualitatively
new skills and expertise.
As a result, the minister failed to become a
political figure served by ministry staff
who were able keep the Ministry informed.
The cabinet model of government,
including relevant mechanisms of political
accountability to the legislature and the
public, was not institutionalized. It was
practiced by the Yushchenko Government
in a “hand$managed” way and was thus
unable to survive his departure.
The principle of governing that Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union 
has proved inadequate to the new challenges of transforming society and
governing democratically. So far, attempts to reform the political decision 
making system in Ukraine have not brought any tangible results. The
objective for the new President of Ukraine has to transform the executive
branch into a non partisan instrument for developing and instituting
government policies 
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Why did meat prices go up?
According to ICPS consumer specialists
Yevhenia Akhtyrko and Liudmyla
Kotusenko, meat prices have been
growing not only because of higher
demand as a result of rising household
incomes, but also because of shrinking
supplies. Compared to the same period
of 2003, in January–August 2004, meat
processing shrank 3.9% and livestock
breeders cut back sales of cattle and
poultry by 7.7%. This caused the cost of
meat to grow 48.4%.
This lower output of meat in 2004 is 
the result of herds and flocks shrinking,
among other reasons, due to a major
grain shortage in the fall of 2003.
Lacking the cash to properly feed their
livestock and expand their herds, farms
began to slaughter cattle, which spurred
a 3.5% growth in meat output in 2003,
compared to 2002. However, with the
2004 grain harvest nearly double that of
2003, livestock breeders have been more
restrained about slaughtering and have
once more begun growing their herds.
This has naturally led to shrinking meat
supplies.
According to ICPS specialists, livestock
headcounts should stabilize, but not
sooner than spring–summer 2005. 
At that point, meat prices can be
expected to drop somewhat.
The last four years, since 2000, have
clearly shown the capacity of the
unreformed bureaucratic system to adapt
and to preserve its old substance in new,
“superimposed” reformist forms. All the
steps taken by the 1999 decrees have
since been revoked, while the apparatus
has maintained complete and utter status
quo—as if no changes had ever been
made. 
This period has also revealed deficiencies
in the management of administrative
reform. No single center was ever
established to be solely responsible for
administrative reform. All Government
efforts to consider reforms as additional
functions or to delegate them to specific
top officials led to failure. In addition,
there was:
• no midterm strategic plan for
implementing administrative reform;
• no proper support in terms of Budget
funding and human resources for the
process of reforming governance;
• no public awareness campaign to inform
all stakeholders and the general public
about the directions and essence of the
measures taken.
The last—but hardly least—problem with
administrative reform in Ukraine is that it
has never been directly aimed at creating
an effective policy$making and policy$
coordination machine. No criteria have
been developed to gauge the
effectiveness of the government policy$
making system, such as:
• capacity to create polices that are not
legally or substantively flawed, that are
economically efficient, and that do not
contradict one another;
• capacity to create policies that are
sustainable in budgetary terms;
• capacity to ensure that decisions are
implemented.
What’s next: Recommendations
Ever since the Concept of Public
Administration Reform was introduced,
the areas of reform that it defined were
neither changed nor fulfilled:
• shifting the role of government from
economic management to the initiation
and development of public policy;
• instituting a new Government mission
that includes upholding human rights
and freedoms and providing public and
civic services;
• transforming the civil service into an
independent, apolitical institution
capable of efficiently carrying out
public policy;
• increasing public engagement in the
formation and implementation of
government policy, and instituting a
system of public oversight of executive
bodies through direct parliamentary
democracy.
This Concept has effectively created a
burgeoning social discourse and an entire
class of specialists have been writing
books and dissertations and organizing
discussions. There are established
champions of this reform in the
Government among politicians and
bureaucrats alike, in the opposition, and
in the NGO community. Moreover, there is
unanimous agreement as to the flaws of
reform that must be corrected.
Our recommendations for the new
President are:
• develop a new strategy for Public
Administration Reform by reformulating
the Concept, building on its strengths
and dealing with its weaknesses,
mobilizing consensus among all key
players, and developing national
support;
• concentrate on institutional capacity to
manage change;
• define the institutional criteria for key
fundamental capacities that need to be
created: management and control of
public finance; conditions and
infrastructure for investment; policy$
making, policy coordination, and
mechanisms to manage change; a
democratic civil service;
• convince donors to concentrate on the
transfer of EU accession institutional
experience in the “twinning” format
rather than individual policy
consultancy.
This report was originally prepared by ICPS
Director Vira Nanivska for UNDP Ukraine. 
To view the complete text, see our website
at http://www.icps.kiev.ua/eng/library/
show.html?6.
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Speaking at ICPS on 5 October 2004,
former US Ambassador to NATO Robert
Hunter predicted the impact on
Ukraine’s future of the transparency
and democracy of its upcoming
presidential election. 
“A free and fair election will, in my
judgment, end all doubts about
Ukraine’s place in the outside world,
any doubts about your right to a place
in Euroatlantic institutions,” said
Hunter. “It can and will lead to
increased investment by outsiders in
this country, as they gain confidence in
a future of Ukrainian society and
democracy. This election can become a
door to prosperity, a recognition of
Ukraine as a leader in a politics of a
free Europe and as a regional leader.
“But,” he warned, “if there is a problem
with the election, there could be
problems afterwards. There could
regrettably be a deferral of Western
engagement. There could be a loss of
respect from your Eastern neighbor,
whose people, the people of Russia,
also look to you for an example. There’s
even a risk that if Ukraine fell behind it
could be bypassed for a stronger
relationship with counties to the East,
to the neglect of this nation.”
Mr. Hunter went on to express
confidence that Ukraine would make
the right choice, not in terms of this 
or that candidate, but in the way it held
the election. He also mentioned that
he had an impression that Ukrainians
had a “strong, deep desire to hold an
honest election.” Once again, 
Mr. Hunter emphasized that deciding
who would be the next president was
the business of Ukrainian voters alone:
“Nobody has the right to tell you what
to do on this matter.”
Now President of the Atlantic Treaty
Association, Robert Hunter is a key
developer of the “New NATO” concept
and co$author of the “Partnership for
Peace” project. He was visiting Kyiv on
the invitation of the Atlantic Council of
Ukraine, the Ukraine$NATO League, and
the International Centre for Policy
Studies.
